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TRANSCRIPT OF KEYNOTE SPEECH 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY 
Stephon Clark, Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, Walter Scott—
all of these individuals share something in common. They all were African-American 
men who were unarmed, who were killed by police officers. The most recent of 
these occurred just a few weeks ago in Sacramento—the name I mentioned first—
Stephon Clark. Police got a call of some burglaries in a residential area. They went 
to investigate, they saw a man, and they chased him. At the time he was ap-
proached by police, he was in his own backyard. The police saw what they thought 
to be a gun. They repeatedly shot Clark. We now know that several shots were fired 
into his back when he was already on the ground. No gun was ever found on or 
around him. There was just a cell phone near his dead body.  
What’s the relationship of these instances of police violence to this sympo-
sium? The most direct relationship is that some of these incidents occurred as a 
result of what started as a Terry stop. But more generally, what I want to suggest to 
you is that what we’ve had in this country for more than a half-century is a choice 
that combating crime is more important than controlling the police. The Supreme 
Court has continually given the police more tools to use and ever greater discretion 
and, at the same time, has lessened the checks that exist on the police. 
I want to make four points. First, I want to suggest to you that Terry v. Ohio is 
both a reflection of, and a cause of, what I’ve described to you in terms of a com-
mitment to combating crime but not controlling police. Second, I want to argue that 
Terry and its progeny, the cases that followed it, have given police almost unlimited 
discretion in their ability to stop individuals. Third, I want to argue that this very 
much contributes to racialized policing in the United States. Then fourth, I want to 
talk about the absence of adequate controls on the police. 
So, let me go back to the first point and discuss how Terry v. Ohio is very much 
a part of what I’ve described. It’s undoubtedly a provocative thesis that we’ve de-
cided to put combating crime ahead of controlling police behavior.  
It is important to situate Terry v. Ohio in the year in which it was decided, 
1968. In that decade, the Warren Court handed down a number of controversial 
rulings all about controlling police behavior. In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme 
Court held that the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment applies to state 
local governments. It was thought, not only by the Warren Court, but by its prede-
cessor courts, that the exclusionary rule was the key way of deterring police viola-
tions of the Fourth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio was met by great criticism, especially 
by law enforcement. Their perspective was that it would mean that criminals would 
get off because of technicalities—evidence that was crucial for prosecutions would 
be excluded.  
In 1965, in Escobedo v. Illinois, the Supreme Court said that the government, 
specifically the police, have to provide counsel for a suspect when the matters shifts 
from just investigative to accusatory. Of course, most controversial of all of this in 
1966, Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court said that in-custodial police interro-
gation is inherently coercive and the Supreme Court said that before the police are 
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going to question somebody who’s in custody, they have to provide a series of 
warnings.  
Law enforcement immediately decried this ruling. They said that it would 
make it impossible for police to get confessions from guilty individuals. Now, history 
has proven that this concern did not manifest itself. Indeed, when the Supreme 
Court was reconsidering Miranda, in Dickinson v. United States, in 2000, it was law 
enforcement that urged the Court to continue the Miranda warnings because it cre-
ated a clear bright-line rule. So long as these warnings were administered, there 
was a presumption that the confession would be allowed to come into evidence. 
But in 1968, Miranda v. Arizona was still very controversial especially for those who 
are most concerned with combatting crime.  
It is in this context, of these very controversial rulings expanding the rights of 
suspects in criminal cases, that the Supreme Court dealt with Terry v. Ohio. And, 
actually, Terry was one of several cases that came to the Supreme Court in October 
Term 1967, dealing with the issues in regard to a now called “stop and frisk”. 
The facts of Terry v. Ohio are familiar to everyone in the room. It involved a 
couple of individuals who were on a street corner. A police officer recognized one 
as a known shoplifter.  The officer regarded the behavior that they were engaged 
in—walking back and forth—as suspicious. And one of the individuals was known 
for pickpocketing. These two individuals were joined by another person and, on this 
basis, the police officer took them into a store, stopped, frisked them, and found 
guns. The issue was whether the guns that they illegally possessed would be admis-
sible in their criminal trials.  
We now know that when the Justices met at conference, Chief Justice Warren 
said that he wanted to use this case as the occasion for laying down strict rules for 
when police could engage in stop and frisk. We know that Chief Justice Warren as-
signed himself writing the opinion. His draft opinion is available; it is totally different 
from what the Supreme Court ultimately released in the case known as Terry v. 
Ohio. He tried to impose on the police clear rules with regard to stop and frisk just 
like Miranda v. Arizona created clear rules with regard to police interrogation.  
The State of Ohio’s primary argument to the Supreme Court was that it should 
not regard what had occurred to John Terry as a search or as a seizure; it was just a 
brief stop, and nothing more than a frisk. The Supreme Court clearly rejected that 
argument. But the question was: what should then be the legal standard?  
Justice Brennan redrafted Chief Justice Warren’s opinion. As I said, the prod-
uct is nothing like the strict controls on police stops that Warren said at a confer-
ence he wanted to impose. Instead the Court said that there can be a stop and a 
frisk so long as there’s reasonable suspicion. The phrase reasonable suspicion 
doesn’t appear in the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment speaks of prob-
able cause. In fact, if you look through Supreme Court history, you don’t find the 
words reasonable suspicion as a legal test until relatively soon before Terry v. Ohio. 
Indeed, it was the year before Terry v. Ohio, in Camara v. Municipal Court, that the 
Supreme Court said, when there’s routine administrative searches, to make sure 
that municipal codes are complied with, there can be entry on reasonable suspicion. 
That case was nothing like the kind of intrusive police action that’s entailed with 
stop and frisk. To be sure, Chief Justice Warren’s majority opinion said that there 
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has to be an articulable basis for the stop and an articulable basis for the frisk.  But 
it is standard that’s much less than probable cause. Justice White wrote a concur-
ring opinion saying that he doesn’t believe the Fourth Amendment is implicated 
here at all; a position much more like that urged by the State of Ohio. Justice Doug-
las wrote a dissent saying that this should be regarded as impermissible under the 
Constitution; the Fourth Amendment require probable cause.  
Why did the Supreme Court abandon Chief Justice Warren’s initial opinion? 
Why didn’t it followed his desire to impose strict limits on the police with regard to 
stop and frisk? I think here, at the time in 1968, the context is enormously im-
portant. There’s great concern about crime and violence in the United States in the 
late 1960s. Soon before, President Lyndon Johnson had created a President’s Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, chaired by Attorney 
General Nicholas Katzenbach. This was a reaction to the perception that crime was 
out of control. 1968 was the year that Richard Nixon ran for President, largely on a 
platform of what he called “law and order” and against the Warren and its deci-
sions. 1968 was a year in the midst of racial violence in the United States. In 1965, 
there was a racially motivated riot in Los Angeles in the Watts area. In the summer 
of 1967, just before the Supreme Court oral arguments in Terry and its companion 
cases, the racially motivated riots in Newark, in Detroit, and in other cities. More 
riots were to follow including the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., on 
April 4, 1968. It was in this context that the Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio.  
I think the Court was also reacting to the great criticism of its earlier decisions, 
especially the ones that I mentioned like Mapp v. Ohio, Escobedo v. Illinois, Miranda 
v. Arizona. The Justices weren’t willing to take another step to significantly limit law 
enforcement in light of this. I thus would regard Terry v. Ohio as a pivotal moment 
with regard to controlling the police. I regard it as the end of the Warren era in this 
regard. The Warren Court was soon to be followed, just a year later, by the Berger 
Court and then the Rehnquist Court and now the Robert’s Court. Each successive 
Court being even less likely to want to impose controls on the police. 
This then brings me to my second point:  Terry and its progeny, the cases that 
have followed it, have it made it possible for the police to stop almost anyone at 
any time. I don’t want to overstate this, not every case that comes to the Supreme 
Court is won by police and law enforcement. There have been many cases where 
the Supreme Court held that the police violated the Fourth Amendment. But I do 
want to suggest that Terry, and the cases that have followed it, have given police 
tremendous discretion on the streets. The discretion is so much, so large, that the 
police really can stop almost anyone, at any time. Consider some of the cases that 
followed Terry.  
One of the most important cases that followed Terry was Whren v. United 
States. Whren involved some undercover police officers in Washington D.C. They 
saw a car stopped at a stop sign. They thought that it was stopped there for an 
unusually long period of time. They said it was for over twenty seconds. Now, one 
of the things you don’t know about me is I have the world’s worst sense of direction. 
I am constantly stopped at stop signs more than twenty seconds to consult—used 
to be a map—my phone and GPS. But the police thought that this was especially 
suspicious. So, they went to follow the car. They followed the car until it made a 
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turn without a signal. They pulled the car over thinking that drugs were present. 
Undercover police officers in D.C. are not supposed to enforce drug laws. They 
shouldn’t have been doing this to start with, but also the crime that this car was 
pulled over for wasn’t having drugs. There was no probable cause of even reasona-
ble suspicion for that. The crime was changing lanes without a turn signal. This quite 
obviously was a pretext for the stop. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court unanimously 
ruled in favor of the police.  
The Supreme Court said the underlying motivations of the police, their sub-
jective intention doesn’t matter. Under the Fourth Amendment it’s an objective test 
as to whether the police have a reasonable basis for concluding there was a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court said, here, the police had a rea-
sonable basis for believing that there was a violation of the law—that the driver had 
changed lanes without a turn signal. Reasonable basis for believing the law was vi-
olated is sufficient for the stop and then, of course, there can be the resulting search 
of the vehicle incident to the stop.  
In many cases since, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that when it comes to 
the Fourth Amendment, the subjective beliefs of the officer don’t matter. It’s just 
an objective test that the officer’s act reasonably, under the circumstances, in be-
lieving there’s a violation the law. The fact that the D.C. officers were violating the 
rules about was what an undercover officer was allowed to do shouldn’t matter the 
Supreme Court says in assessing whether there’s probable cause. It’s an aside here, 
but just this year, in 2018, in District of Columbia v. Wesby, Justice Ginsburg in a 
concurring opinion said the Supreme Court should reconsider Whren.  District of 
Columbia v. Wesby wasn’t about Whren. District Columbia v. Wesby involved police 
getting a tip of a party in a house that was supposed to be unoccupied and whether 
the police violated the Fourth Amendment by arresting the individuals under the 
circumstances, and whether even if they violated the Fourth Amendment they 
would be protected by qualified immunity. It’s notable that Justice Ginsburg used 
this case at the occasion for saying the Court should re-examine Whren. I don’t see 
a likelihood that there’s a majority of the justices on the Court who are so inclined, 
but at least now in 2018, we have one Justice on record in that regard.  
Another case that expanded the discretion of the police was Illinois v. Ward-
low.  In what the Supreme Court described as a high-crime area, four police cars 
were driving down the street in caravan fashion. A man seeing this decided to go 
quickly in the other direction. The police seeing him change course and go in the 
other direction decided that that was a sufficient basis for a stop and frisk. Was that 
behavior sufficient to be an articulable ground for suspicion under the standard of 
Terry v. Ohio? The Supreme Court said, yes, that was sufficient for reasonable cause 
to justify the stop. 
I grew up on the south side of Chicago. My guess is a lot of people on the south 
side of Chicago, and especially African-American and Latino men, have every reason 
to go in the other direction when they see the police. That’s true in most major 
cities. And yet the Supreme Court says just that behavior, seeing the police and go-
ing the other way, is enough to meet the Terry standard for reasonable suspicion.  
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One more case I would mention here, from just a couple of years ago, is Utah 
v. Strieff. Police were observing a house in Utah, where they believe that drug deal-
ing was occurring. They saw a man enter the house and quickly come out. The office 
went up to the man and said, “What’s your name?” Strieff answered honestly. The 
officer detained Strieff long enough to do a check to see if there were any outstand-
ing arrest warrants. There was an old outstanding warrant for Strieff. Fraco arrested 
Strieff pursuant to that old outstanding warrant and a search was done and drugs 
were found. At the time office stopped Strieff, the officer lacked probable cause; he 
lacked even reasonable suspicion. There seems little doubt that the stop here vio-
lated even the relaxed standard of Terry v. Ohio.  
The question is, did the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule allow 
the drugs that were found on Strieff to come into evidence? The Supreme Court, in 
a five to three decision, found that the attenuation exception applied, and the drugs 
were admissible as evidence. The Utah Supreme Court, and I don’t think of it as one 
of the most liberal state supreme courts in the country, had unanimously ruled in 
favor of Edward Strieff saying that the police violation of the Fourth Amendment 
meant the evidence should be excluded. But the United States Supreme Court, an 
opinion by Justice Thomas reversed. Justice Sotomayor wrote a powerful dissent. 
She talked about the large number of people for whom there are outstanding arrest 
warrants. She spoke of the incentive that this gives to the police to stop individuals, 
even without reasonable suspicion, knowing that they can then do a warrant check 
and if they find a warrant, they could do a search, and if anything is found, the evi-
dence would be admissible. If nothing is found, the person is then let go.  
Police are very responsive to Supreme Court decisions. Not long after this de-
cision, I met with the inspector general of Los Angeles Police Department and mem-
bers of the inspector general’s staff. They said already police in L.A. had gotten the 
word that they can stop individuals without needing reasonable suspicion, check 
for a warrant, knowing if they find one, they could do a search incident to the arrest 
and the evidence would be admissible.  
If you put together just the cases that I’ve mentioned, Terry v. Ohio, Whren v. 
United States, Illinois v. Wardlow, and Utah v. Strieff, think of what it means. Start 
with driving on streets. The police can follow any of us, and wait until we change 
lanes without a signal, or turn without our signal on, or not stop quite long enough 
at a stop sign, a rolling stop, and then pull us over, even if their underlying motiva-
tion has nothing to do with enforcing traffic laws. If the police follow any of us long 
enough, they will at some point observe something like changing lanes without a 
signal or turning without a signal or a stop that they can describe as a rolling stop 
or some other minor police violation. The police, when out on the streets, can cer-
tainly stop anybody, if they can articulate some suspicion. Suspicion can be as much 
as just going the opposite direction as the police. And after Utah v. Strieff, the police 
can feel pretty confident they can stop somebody even in violation of Terry v. Ohio, 
check for an outstanding warrant, and then do a search if there is one. I think if you 
look at these cases together, you can see why I say they give police tremendous 
discretion. The discretion is enough to make it possible for police to stop almost 
anybody at any time.  
292 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
 
 
This leads to the third point: this very much contributes to racialized policing 
in the United States. Every study that’s been done with regard to the criminal justice 
system tells us that when there is discretion it’s exercised in a racially biased man-
ner. Studies have been done in terms of police encounters with individuals, and 
holding all else constant, if the suspect is African-American or Latino, he or she is 
much more likely to be arrested than if the individual is White. Studies have been 
done on prosecutorial behavior and they show that holding all other variables con-
stant, if the criminal suspect is African-American or Latino, he or she is more likely 
to be charged than if the suspect is white; the charges are likely to be greater. We 
can see the same thing in terms of convictions, the same thing in terms of sen-
tences.  
Against this backdrop, it shouldn’t surprise us that the more discretion that 
we give to the police, the more likely that it’s going to be used in a racially discrim-
inatory fashion. This was part of what the Supreme Court was considering in Terry 
v. Ohio. This idea of racially motivated policing isn’t a new insight in 2018. The Su-
preme Court very briefly addresses it and they do so in a very cryptic passage that 
I’ve never quite understood.  Chief Justice Warren wrote: “The wholesale harass-
ment by certain elements the police community of which minority groups particu-
larly Negros frequently complained will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evi-
dence from any criminal trial.” In other words, the exclusionary rule isn’t going to 
be enough to stop racially discriminatory policing.  The Court continued: “Yet a rigid, 
an unthinking application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices 
which you can never use to control may exact a high toll in human injury and frus-
tration of efforts to prevent crime.” So, the Court says, if it were to limit stop and 
frisk based on a concern for racially-motivated policing, that would exact a high toll 
in human injury. I think that refers to injury to police officers and frustration of ef-
forts to prevent crime. Isn’t that a very clear declaration by the Supreme Court what 
I stated as my thesis that we are choosing combating crime over limiting police be-
havior.  
Studies have been done that show that stop and frisk is conducted in a racially 
discriminatory fashion. It is very difficult to measure this just by looking at cases 
because obviously many of the stops will never lead to cases that are brought to 
Court. Many of the stops find no evidence, literally no criminal prosecutions. But 
some studies have been done by monitoring police behavior. I think the most im-
portant was that which was part of a lawsuit, Floyd v. City of New York, in the South-
ern District of New York.  The study examined the way in which stop and frisk is 
done in New York City.  The statistics here are startling. It looked at between January 
2004 and January 2012, an eight-year period. There were 4.4 million stops by the 
police. That statistic by itself is staggering. Of those only six percent resulted in ar-
rests and six percent resulted in summonses. In other words, 88% of the 4.4 million 
stops resulted in no further action, meaning a vast majority of those that were 
stopped were doing nothing wrong. More than half of all the people who were 
stopped were frisked. Yet only 1.5% of the frisks found weapons. In 83% of the 
cases, the person stopped was Black or Hispanic, even though those two groups 
accounted for only half of the population of New York. The evidence clearly showed 
the police carried out more stops on Black and Hispanic residents, even though all 
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other relevant factors were controlled for. An officer was more likely to use force 
against minority residents even though stops of minorities were less likely to result 
in weapon seizures than stops of whites. 
This was on this basis that Judge Shira Scheindlin, in the Southern District of 
New York, found a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The then mayor of New 
York, Michael Bloomberg, vehemently objected to her conclusions. The Second Cir-
cuit ordered Judge Shira Scheindlin taken off of the case. But then a new mayor in 
New York was elected and a consent decree was entered. Stop and frisk has not 
been eliminated in New York, though it’s been greatly restricted and there’s been 
no effect in terms of crime control. Crime has continued to decrease in New York 
during all of this time.  
I taught at the University of Southern California for twenty-one years. There 
was not a class that I did not teach where I did not have African-American and Latino 
men telling stories of being stopped by Los Angeles police officers while walking 
down the street or driving, simply for driving while Black or Brow, or walking while 
Black or brown. This is what Terry v. Ohio has contributed greatly to in the United 
States.  
My fourth and final point is that the Supreme Court has prevented there being 
effective controls on police behavior. Perhaps, despite what I’ve said, still many be-
lieve that it’s important, in order to combat crime, to give police the power that 
Terry v. Ohio bestowed upon them. But if so, then we need to have adequate con-
trols and checks on the police. If you think about it, almost every check or control 
that exists, the Supreme Court has undermined so that right now we have relatively 
little in the way of stopping abusive police behavior. 
Consider what are the possible checks on the police. One that I’ve already al-
luded to is the exclusionary rule. As I mentioned, it was long thought that this was 
to be the primary deterrent of police violations of the Fourth Amendment. Their 
knowledge that if they offended the Constitution the evidence would be excluded 
was thought to discourage violations of the Fourth Amendment. Of course, the ex-
clusionary rule only applies if there is a prosecution and if there is evidence, it 
doesn’t do anything for all of the other situations. And also, the exclusionary rule 
isn’t going to help if the doctrine means that no violation of the Fourth Amendment 
is going to be found. If it’s so easy for the police consistent with the Fourth Amend-
ment to justify a stop as reasonable, there will be no basis for excluding the evi-
dence.  
But even beyond that, the Supreme Court has greatly weakened the exclu-
sionary role. In Herring v. United States, the Supreme Court said that the exclusion-
ary rule doesn’t apply to good faith or negligent violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment. It applies to only intentional or reckless violations of the Fourth Amendment. 
So even if it’s found that the police violated the relaxed standards of Terry, of 
Whren, of Wardlow, of Strieff, the evidence still will not be excluded unless one can 
say that the police behavior was beyond good faith, beyond negligent, and 
amounted an intentional or reckless behavior.  
Another possibility of course is to sue for injunctive relief, to try to prove a 
pattern and practice of police violation of the Fourth Amendment and then get an 
injunction to halt the conduct. But the Supreme Court has made it very hard to sue 
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police departments for injunctions. The key case here was City of Los Angeles v. 
Lyons in 1982. Adolph Lyons was a twenty-three-year-old African-American man, 
stopped by Los Angeles police officers, about two in the morning for a burned-out 
taillight. The officers, lawfully, ordered Lyons to get out of his car. An officer 
slammed Lyons hands above his head on the roof of the car. Lyons complained that 
he was holding his keys and they were cutting into the skin of his palm. An officer 
then administered a choke hold on Lyons. It rendered him unconscious. He woke 
spitting blood and dirt. He had urinated and defecated. The officers gave him a traf-
fic citation and allowed him to go. Lyons did some research and he discovered to 
that point sixteen people in Los Angeles, most all like him, African-American men, 
had died from police use of the chokehold.  
Lyons sued for an injunction to stop the police from using the chokehold ex-
cept when necessary to protect the officer’s life or safety. The Supreme Court in a 
five-to-four decision ordered Lyons suit dismissed. Justice Byron White wrote the 
opinion for the Court. He said Lyons lacked standing to sue for an injunction because 
he could not show that it was likely that he’d personally be choked again in the 
future. The Supreme Court said a plaintiff, like Lyons, who is suing for an injunction 
must show a likelihood of future personal injury. This makes it very difficult to sue 
police departments for injunctive relief. There’s a case in Chicago where some 
women had been stopped by police officers for routine traffic violations and were 
subjected to degrading and humiliating strip searches. They brought a lawsuit say-
ing that the police use of strip searches under these circumstances violated the Con-
stitution, but the case was dismissed based on City of Los Angeles v. Lyons because 
they could not show that it was likely that they’d personally be stopped again by 
police officers and subjected to a strip search. A person who is stopped, without 
reasonable suspicion, just for being African-American or Latino, will find it hard to 
bring a suit for injunctive relief because of the inability to prove it’ll happen to him 
or her again in the future. 
Another possibility for relief is to sue the local government -- the city or the 
county -- that employs the police officers. But the Supreme Court has made this 
very difficult as well. In Monell v. Department of Social Services in 1978, the Su-
preme Court ruled that local governments can be sued only if it can be shown that 
they have a policy that violates the Constitution. Cities cannot be liable on respond-
ent superior basis. Any other employer in tort law can be held liable on respondent 
superior basis for actions of an employee in the scope of duties, but not a local gov-
ernment. It has to be demonstrated that it has a policy that violates the Constitu-
tion. In Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, the Court said that Monell applies -- 
and the requirement for proving policy exists -- whether it is a suit for money or 
injunctive relief.  
There’s one more option: suing the police officer. The officer who engages in 
the illegal stop, the illegal frisk, might be sued for money damages. There’s enor-
mous problems with this before you ever get to the law. If all that’s been done to a 
person is being stopped by the police, frisked, and then let go, are there sufficient 
damages to justify a lawyer taking the case and bringing the litigation? If it’s some-
body where evidence has been found, and the person is going to be convicted of a 
crime, how likely is the individual going to be to successfully sue the police for a 
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violation of the Fourth Amendment? And even if there is such a suit, think back to 
how the standards that I described, make it so easy for the police to come up with 
some articulable suspicion and say that the stop, the frisk, didn’t violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  
Even if you get pass all of this, the Supreme Court has created doctrines that 
make it very hard to successfully sue police. The one that’s most applicable here is 
qualified immunity. All government officers, federal, state, and local, when they’re 
sued for money damages can invoke an immunity. For some tasks, some officers, 
its absolute immunity, they can’t be sued for money damages at all. Judges for in-
stance, have absolute immunity for their judicial acts; prosecutors have absolute 
immunity for their prosecutorial acts. Police officers, when they testify in court, 
have absolute immunity in civil suits for money damages. Even if a police officer 
knowingly commits perjury, a plaintiff cannot civilly sue that officer for money dam-
ages. That was the Court’s holding in Briscoe v. Lahue in 1983.  
When an officer doesn’t have absolute immunity, the officer is protected by 
qualified immunity. That means the officer can be sued and held liable only if he or 
she violates clearly established law that every reasonable officer knows and it has 
to be a right that’s established beyond dispute.  And the right must be established 
at a very specific level of abstraction. In case after case involving claims of excessive 
of police force, the Supreme Court has summarily reversed the Court of Appeals 
and said the officer is protected by qualified immunity. Most recently, in Kisella v.  
Hughes, the police got a phone call that a woman who had a history of mental illness 
had a knife.  When the police arrived at the scene, the woman seemed to be hacking 
away at the tree with a knife. The police shot and seriously wounded her. The police 
weren’t threatened by her, she didn’t hold up the knife, she didn’t have any ability 
to approach the police. The question was: is this a matter that the jury should be 
able to decide whether there was excessive force. The Ninth Circuit said yes.  But 
the Supreme Court in a per curium opinion, decided without briefing or oral argu-
ment, said the officers are protected by qualified immunity. Justice Sotomayor 
wrote a powerful dissent about the authority this gives police to shoot first and ask 
questions later. The ability then to sue police officers and recover money damages 
is enormously limited by qualified immunity, as well as the doctrines of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Based on all of this, you can see why I say that, at least for the last fifty years, 
as a society we’ve decided that controlling crime is more important than controlling 
police behavior. I fear that I painted a very bleak picture and yet I am, by nature, an 
optimist. I very much believe that Dr. Martin King, Jr. got it right when he said, “The 
arc of the moral universe is long and bends toward justice.” I am hopeful that the 
names that I mentioned at the beginning and that the work of Black Lives Matter, 
will cause us to re-examine policing in the United States and that if there’s another 
conference on the hundredth anniversary of Terry v. Ohio, there will be a very dif-
ferent discussion than the one we are’ having today. 
